These questions are controversial and have therefore been the subject of an important debate, not least in the pages of this Journal. In view of its direct policy involvement in developing countries around the globe, the World Bank has been a major participant in this debate. In a large number of studies and reports, i World Bank economists have provided detailed analyses of these questions. Specifically, they have argued that the best way to achieve economic growth for developing countries is to be highly open to the world economy and to seek a close integration with it. On the second issue, they have suggested a relatively limited role for the state, encapsulated in the concept of a 'market-friendly' approach to development.
The importance of the World Bank analyses and conclusions on these subjects for economic policy hardly needs any emphasis. However, these analyses are also significant for another reason: since the beginning of this decade, Bank economists have departed significantly from the extreme free market neoclassical perspectives which often characterised their contributions in the 1980s. In that sense, the Bank's views on these questions today probably represent the professional mainstream.
The main purpose of this paper is to carry forward the recent debate ii between the World Bank and the heterodox or 'revisionist' economists, which centres around the analysis of the development experience of the economically highly successful East Asian countries. It will be suggested here that this debate has already made considerable progress and has led to a degree of convergence between the two schools on a range of analytical and empirical issues, though, as will soon become evident below, not yet on policy. This paper aims to carry this process further by identifying and commenting on the most important issues which still remain in contention.
The paper will, inter alia, outline an alternative framework for examining the question of openness, which leads to a rather different policy conclusion than that above. It will be argued here that, in contrast to the recommendations of the Bretton Wood institutions, developing countries should actively seek 'strategic' rather than 'close' integration with the international economy. Further, the paper will suggest that government needs to have a far bigger role in economic activity than is envisaged in the 'market-friendly' approach. It is contended that in mixed economy countries with reasonably effective states, the government should pursue a dynamic industrial policy to bring about the desired structural transformations in the economy as speedily as possible, to achieve fast economic growth. These, it is argued, are the correct lessons to be learnt from the East Asian economic record.
Taking into account previous contributions to the debate, the paper concentrates on the following specific issues:
(a) the question of the effectiveness of industrial policy; (b) the issue of 'openness'; (c) the nature of competition in domestic markets and (d) the relationship between technology policy, industrial policy and international competitiveness. Particular attention will be paid here to the theoretical underpinnings of the World Bank analyses of these issues. Specifically, the neglect of the role of 'demand' in such analyses will be highlighted. This, it will be shown, leads to incorrect interpretations of the East Asian development record at key stages of the Bank's argument.
For space reasons, and also to sharpen the debate, the empirical analysis will be confined here to Japan and South Korea -two of the most important exemplar countries. It will be shown that a
proper consideration of the role of the balance of payments constraint and of demand leads to a rather different interpretation of the experience of these economies from that provided by World Bank economists.
THE MARKET-FRIENDLY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT: THE BANK'S THESIS
The concept of the 'market friendly' strategy of development was put forward in the World Bank's seminal 1991 Report: The Challenge of Development. [World Bank,(1991) , hereafter referred to as the Report's analysis came to the conclusion that the more open an economy, the greater the degree of competition and the higher its investment in education, the greater would be its growth of TFP and hence its overall economic growth. Although the significance of international economic factors was recognised, a major argument of the Report was that domestic policy matters far more for raising per capita incomes than world economic conditions.
With respect to economic policy, the Report concluded that:
"Economic theory and practical experience suggest that (government) interventions are likely to help provided they are market-friendly" (p. 5). In order for `market-friendly' not to be a mere tautology, the Report, to its credit, defined the concept fairly precisely in the following terms:
a. Intervene reluctantly. Let markets work unless it is demonstrably better to step in... [It] is usually a mistake for the state to carry out physical production, or to protect the domestic production of a good that can be imported more cheaply and whose local production offers few spillover benefits. including Japan. This study fully acknowledges the facts of enormous government economic interventions in most spheres in these countries, much as documented by the revisionist school.
However, the Study goes on to suggest that such interventions, particularly in the sphere of industrial policy, had in general a limited effect. Some of these worked for some of the time in a few countries, but overall they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the extraordinary success of these countries. Thus, In other words, the final policy conclusion is still to reassert the 'market friendly' strategy of development -developing countries are recommended to seek their comparative advantage, to 'get their prices right' and to have free markets as far as possible.
THE TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY(TFP) APPROACH TO ECONOMIC GROWTH
The theoretical foundation of the World Bank analyses is the TFP approach to economic growth. It is suggested that inter-country and inter-temporal variations in growth rates are caused by variations in total factor productivity of capital and labour.
Changes in the latter variable are thought to be determined mainly by economic policy -the degree of openness of an economy, the extent of competition in the product and factor markets, and investment in physical and human capital (education), particularly the latter. The underlying chain of causation is that competition and education promote technical progress, and therefore TFP growth and hence economic expansion. "Free mobility of people, capital, and technology" and "free entry and exit of firms" are regarded as being particularly conducive to the spread of knowledge and technical change.
Now at a theoretical level, there are several well-known objections to the causal model underlying the TFP approach to economic growth.
The model assumes for example full employment of resources and perfect competition, none of which obtain in the real world.
Moreover, it is a wholly supply-side model which ignores altogether Ojimi of MITI as follows:
The MITI decided to establish in Japan industries which require intensive employment of capital and technology, industries that in consideration of comparative cost of production should be the most inappropriate for Japan, industries such as steel, oil-refining, petro-chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics, including electronic computers. From a short-run, static viewpoint, encouragement of such industries would seem to conflict with economic rationalism. But, from a long-range viewpoint, these are precisely the industries where income elasticity of demand is high, technological progress is rapid, and labour productivity rises fast. [OECD, 1972] . Boltho (1985a Boltho ( , 1985b assesses the Japanese industrial policy on these criteria and concludes that the policy was successful.
Boltho's analysis is complemented by Magziner and Hout's (1980) detailed and careful evidence based on case studies of several specific industries. These strongly suggest that the industrial policies were successful in propelling the targeted industries into pre-eminence in international competition. So how do World
Bank economists conclude that industrial policy in countries like Japan or South Korea was ineffective?
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY INEFFECTIVENESS DOCTRINE
The first reason for this negative assessment is that Bank economists have a very narrow definition of industrial policy, considering it only as a policy to upgrade industrial structure. The problem with test (b) is that it overlooks the effects of industrial policy on a country's balance of payments and its long term rate of growth of domestic demand. By confining their attention only to the supply side effects of productivity growth and technical change, as predicated by the TFP approach, Bank economists hypothesise that 'spillovers' of these activities will be confined only to the favoured sectors or their close sub-sectors within the two digit industrial classification which they have analysed. However, to the extent that industrial policy helps to relieve the balance of payments constraint, most sectors will benefit from higher rates of growth of production and hence productivity (by Verdoorn's Law) and not just the favoured sectors.
In other words, the spillovers will be almost universal.
Thus test (b) cannot discriminate between industrial policy and non-industrial policy states. To do that, one needs to look also at the costs and benefits of industrial policy interventions in terms of their relaxing the balance of payments constraint in the short and the long run. More specifically, it would require inter alia, an examination of the contribution of the favoured sectors to the growth of exports or to the reduction in the growth of imports over time.
It is the failure to consider such factors which leads Bank economists to conclude that South Korea's Heavy and Chemical industry (HCI) drive in the 1970s was unsuccessful, while revisionist economists suggest that it was a success. The reason for these conflicting judgements is that Bank economists do not consider its benefits to the long term trajectory of the balance of payments and hence to overall economic growth. Amsden(1989) points out that the mainstay of Korea's celebrated export success in the 1980s was precisely these HCI industries. is inappropriate for such analysis.
OPENNESS: 'CLOSE' VERSUS 'STRATEGIC' INTEGRATION WITH THE WORLD ECONOMY (a) Degrees of Openness of the East Asian Economies
The virtues of openness, international competition, close integration with the world economy, are stressed in several Bank publications (see in particular the 1991 Report). Evidence suggests, however, that these virtues were not in fact practised by either Japan or Korea.
To illustrate, the Japanese economy operated under rigorous import controls, whether formal or informal, throughout the 1950s and More generally, protection provided the Japanese companies with a captive home market leading to high profits which enabled the firms to undertake higher rates of investment, to learn by doing and to improve the quality of their products. These profits in the protected internal market, which were further enhanced by restrictions on domestic competition (see Section VII), not only made possible higher rates of investment but also greatly aided exports. Yamamura (1988) shows how these protective policies gave the Japanese firm 'a strategic as well as a cost advantage' over foreign competitors. In other words protection, export promotion and performance standards were very much complementary policies. Report) the purpose of Bank economists was to find out why countries like Japan have been so successful in economic development during the last forty years, they have clearly been using the wrong paradigm for examining Japanese economic history.
The basic problem is that the underlying assumptions of this paradigm are greatly at variance with the real world of static and dynamic economies of scale, learning by doing, and imperfect competition. In such a world, even neoclassical analysis now accepts that the optimal degree of openness for a country is not "close" integration with the global economy through free trade. The Latin American pattern, he suggests, has been shaped largely by mercantilist market access rather than by cost minimising objectives. As a result, it is more vulnerable to disruptive shifts of trading advantages deriving from changes in the marketing and financial strategies of foreign firms.
COMPETITION IN THE DOMESTIC MARKETS
World Bank economists have traditionally stressed the merits of competition in the domestic product, capital and labour markets.
However, the practice of the successful East Asian countries in this respect also has been rather different. As in relation to the question of integration with the world economy, Japan and Korea appear to have taken the view that from the dynamic perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition is not perfect or maximum competition. The governments in these countries have therefore managed or guided competition in a purposeful manner: it has both been encouraged, but notably also restricted in a number of ways.
(a) Collusion and Competition in Japan
To illustrate, it is useful to reflect on some of the blatant were receiving its attention, MITI essentially organized an "investment race" among large oligopolistic firms in which exports and international market share were significant performance goals.
As in the real world markets are always incomplete, such a race without a coordinator could lead to ruinous competition, price wars and excess capacity, inhibiting the inducement to invest.
In the Japanese economic miracle, MITI provided this crucial coordinating role and orchestrated the dynamic combination of collusion and competition which characterizes Japanese industrial policy. Yamamura notes that what MITI did was to 'guide' the firms to invest in such a way that each large firm in a market expanded its productive capacity roughly in proportion to its current market share ─ no firm was to make an investment so large that it would destabilize the market. The policy was effective in encouraging competition for the market share (thus preserving the essential competitiveness of the industrial markets) while reducing the risk of losses due to excessive investment. Thus, it promoted the aggressive expansion of capacity necessary to increase productive efficiency.
(b) Large Firms and Domestic Competition in Korea
Turning to Korea, that country also did not follow a policy of maximum domestic competition or unfettered market-determined entry or exit of firms. The Korean government, if anything, went one step further than the Japanese in actively helping to create large conglomerates, promoting mergers, and directing entry and exit of firms according to the requirements of technological scale economies and world demand conditions. The result is that Korea's manufacturing industry displays one of the highest levels of market concentration anywhere. The top 50 chaebols accounted for 15 percent of the country's GDP in 1990. Among the largest 500 industrial companies in the world in 1990, there were eleven Korean firms, the same number as Switzerland. UN(1993) observes in relation to the Korean industrial structure: "Such a structure is the deliberate creation of the Government, which utilised a highly interventionist strategy to push industry into large-scale, complex technologically demanding activities while simultaneously restricting FDI inflows tightly to promote national ownership. It was deemed necessary to create enterprises of large size and diversity, to undertake the risk inherent in launching in high-technology, high-skill activities that would remain competitive in world markets.
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the big business groups still exhibited highly rivalrous behaviour (Kim, 1992) The changing factor proportions (in the sense of human capital and skill formation) over time in the East Asian countries, was
clearly not simply an outcome of 'natural market forces' as per capita income rose. Rather these developments were very much guided by the visible hand of the government in terms of its national priorities.
CONCLUSION
As detailed in the previous pages, there has been considerable progress in the debate between heterodox and World Bank economists concerning the outstandingly successful development experience of East Asian economies like Japan or Korea. There is now general agreement that governments in these countries intervened heavily in all spheres of the economy in order to achieve rapid economic growth and fast industrialisation. It is also common ground that during the course of their development these countries did not have free and flexible internal or external product and capital markets. Although these countries were export oriented, they Bank not concern itself more with the institutional imitation and innovation of the kind outlined above, than with prescribing market-friendliness or close integration with the world economy (which these countries did not practice)?
i. The World Bank's annual World Development Reports are useful sources for the analysis of these issues. However, for reasons given in section II, the two most important documents in this context are World Bank (1991, 1993) . The latter are seminal works which provide a comprehensive account of Bank economists' thinking on these and other development problems and their conclusions on public policy. These are therefore the specific documents this paper draws upon in all references made to the Bank's analyses.
ii. See the commentaries in this Journal by Amsden et al (1994) on World Bank (1993).
iii.There is an enormous literature on the subject. For a lucid analysis of the relevant issues under discussion here, see Nelson [1981] . iv.The classic references here are Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor (1966) . For a review, see Mcombie (1987) . The TFP growth table in the 1991 Report shows that in general, the larger the fall in the growth of output (in 1973-87 compared with the earlier period), the greater the reduction in TFP growth, much as would be predicted by Verdoorn's Law. Moreover, the South Asian region is the only one to record an increase in TFP growth in the second period; it is also the only one with a substantial trend increase in GDP growth in that period. v. The period 1950-73, when the OECD economy grew at an unprecedented rate of almost 5% per annum─twice its historic trend rate of growth─has rightly been termed the Golden Age of capitalism. Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh, (1990) provide a detailed analysis of why the Golden Age rose in the first place and why it fell following the 1973 oil shock. See also Maddison [1982] ; Bruno and Sachs [1985] ; Kindleberger [1992] . To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasised that we are not considering here the question of short term demand management, but rather that of the forces which affect the long term rate of growth of demand. vi. See for example Lucas (1973) . vii. See further Johnson, Tyson and Zysman (1989) . There have been important changes in the 1970s and the 1980s in the nature and conduct of MITI's industrial policies, compared with the 1950s and the 1960s. In general, MITI does not now have the same kind of coercive policy instruments as it did in the high growth period. It therefore has to use more indirect instruments as well as moral persuasion to a far larger degree than it did before. viii. Thus the Miracle Study: "We define industrial policies, as distinct from trade policies, as government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity-based growth." (p.304). ix. The question of the time horizon over which the costs and benefits of industrial policy interventions are assessed is of crucial importance. Amsden and Singh(1994) point out that for thirty years there were few foreign cars to be seen on Korean roads and few Korean cars to be seen on foreign roads. In other words, the Korean government provided protection to the car industry for long periods of time because of the difficulties involved in the learning and the assimilation of foreign technology in developing countries.
x.See for example Krugman (1987) and Roderick (1992) . xi.On this point, see the interesting review by Lucas (1990) of Helpman & Krugman (1989) . xii. See further Freeman(1989) 
